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THE SALE OF A LAW PRACTICE: 
TOW ARD A PROFESSIONALLY 
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH 
Leslie A. Minkus-
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical situation: Lawyer A has 
been practicing in the same community for over thirty years. He 
is competent, respected, and trusted. At the age of sixty he de-
cides to retire. As a responsible lawyer, he wishes to assure that 
. his clients' matters are handled competently in the future. For 
the past few years he has been impressed with the quality of 
work of Lawyer B, age 42, who has had a sole practice for fifteen 
years, the last three in the local community. Because of A's ex-
perience, he knows which attorneys in town are competent and 
responsible. Largely because of B's newness in the community, A 
believes it likely that many of his clients, if left to their own 
devices, would select from among several more established but, 
in his view, less competent attorneys. With the dual purpose of 
providing for his own financial security, and providing compe-
tent representation for his present clients, A suggests to B the 
following arrangement: A agrees that he will, in writing, inform 
his clients that (1) he intends to retire, (2) they are entirely free 
to select any attorney they wish to represent them, (3) he recom-
IIlends that they retain Attorney B (and the reasons for the rec-
ommendation), and (4) he will receive compensation from Attor-
ney B which is based in part on the gross income earned by B. B 
agrees that he will pay to A, over several years, certain amounts, 
contingent in part upon the gross income of B. 
Despite the full disclosure, and the fact that A's clients are 
• Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. A.B., 1955, University of California, 
Berkeley; J.D., 1962, Stanford University. 
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likely to receive better representation than they would otherwise 
receive, the agreement is invalid! to the extent that the sale 
price exceed the value of the tangible assets of A's practice. Yet, 
if A entered into the same financial agreement with B, brought 
in B as a "partner", sent out announcements of the partnership, 
and three months later retired from practice, the financial agree-
ment would be valid. This, even though the clients would not 
have had the benefits of disclosure as to the nature of the ar-
rangement, the reasons why A has associated B, or indeed of 
their right to retain other counsel. That the second arrangement 
is consistent with the American Bar Association's Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility,lI and the first is not, suggests it is time 
to reconsider the rules governing the sale of a law practice.8 
Why should a sole practitioner be precluded from entering 
into an objectively sensible agreement which will provide bene-
fits to him on retirement and to his heirs upon his death?4 Per-
haps the most quoted (though hardly the most persuasive) ex-
planation is contained in an opinion issued by the New York 
County Lawyer's Association: "Clients are not merchandise, 
Lawyers are not Tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but per-
sonal service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would 
appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts of our profes-
sional status. "II 
1. Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1975). 
2. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as ABA 
Code I DR 2·107; EC 4·3. References to the ABA Code are to the existing Code which 
was adopted in 1969, amended on several occasions, and has been enacted, substantially 
in toto, in all states except California. For the specific provisions of each state's code, see 
ABA COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, CODE or PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1977). All references to Disciplinary Rules ("DRs") and Ethi· 
cal Considerations ("ECs") are to the existing ABA MODEL C()DII or PR0PB8810NAL Ra· 
SPONSIBILITY. For the most part, the PROPOSED MODEL RULBS or PR0PB8810NAL CONDUCT 
(the "KUTAK COMMISSION REPORT") are not significantly different with respect to the 
problems discussed in this article. But see note 37, infra. 
3. "Sale of a law practice" means the sale of a practice as a going concern, fre· 
quently described as the sale of "good will". Although this article deals with the sale of a 
practice as a unit, the same considerations are involved if only a portion of a practice Ie 
sold, or if certain portions are sold to different lawyers. 
4. Very little has been written about the ethical iBBues raiaed by such a sale. See 
Katten, Sale of a Law Practice: Federal Tax and Ethical Aspects, 54 ILL. S.B.J. 686 
(1966); McCarthy, Termination of a Law Practice, 64 WIS. BAR BULL. July 1981, at 61; 
Sterett, The Sale of a Law Practice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 306 (1972); Thurm, Dispoeaolof 
an Attorney's Practice, 59 A.B.A.J. 68 (1973). The Sterrett article is the only one which 
seriously attempts to analyze rather than describe the bases for the proacription. 
5. New York County Lawyers Association Op. 109 (1943). The opinion recalls Judge 
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In this article I shall set out the bases for the prohibition of 
the sale of a law practice, examine those bases, suggest that the 
legitimate criticisms which have been raised are overbroad, and 
propose that, in at least some situations, sales should be allowed 
and, when necessary, appropriate amendments to the Code of 
Professional Responsibility be enacted. 
II. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE SALE OF A LAW 
PRACTICE 
A lawyer can, of course, sell tangible assets-e.g., library 
books, furniture, office equipment, and the like. He can also sell 
his accounts receivable provided that the sale price reflects only 
the amount owed the lawyer for services performed up to the 
time of sale. But he is prohibited from selling what has generally 
been referred to' as "good Will."8 In other words, the lawyer can 
realize only "liquidation" v~ue and not "going concern" value 
for his practice.? 
Interestingly enough, despite the obvious importance of the 
matter to the practicing bar, there is no specific disciplinary rule 
in the ABA Code which precludes the sale of gtJOd will.s None-
Cardozo's admonition that "[mjetaphors ... starting as devices to liberate thought ... 
end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94,155 N.E. 58, 61 
(1926). 
6. "The 'good will' of a business is the expectation of continued public patronage." 
CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West 1964). 
7. Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1975). Geffen is the only 
case in which a court squarely held invalid a contractual provision for the sale of good 
will. In Geffen, the selling lawyer, (Geffen), had been appointed a U.S. Magistrate. The 
agreement provided that Geffen would encourage his former clients to retain Moss, and 
attributed $15,000 of the $27,500 sales price to the value of the physical assets. The court 
concluded that, despite the fact that the contract made no reference to good will, Moss' 
expectation of future busineBB from Geffen's present clients was a principal motivating 
factor. This attempted sale of good will was held invalid as contrary to public policy and 
against the spirit and intent of Rules 2 and 3 (dealing with solicitation and payment for 
recommendations) of the former California Rules of ProfeBSional Conduct. MOBS was 
held not liable for the payment of the $12,500 presumably attributable to the good will 
factor. 
8. The ABA Code has a tripartite organization. There are 9 canons-statements of 
general principles-each of which includes Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considera-
tions. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational only; violation of a Disciplinary Rule, 
however, may result in disciplinary sanctions. The only specific mention of the sale of a 
law practice is contained in EC 4-6, which states that "[ajlawyer should not attempt to 
sell a law practice as a going busineBB because, among other things, to do 80 would in-
volve the disclosure of confidences and secrets." California has not adopted the ABA 
Code, and the California Rules of Professional Conduct do not contain Ethical Consider-
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theless, the authorities are unanimous that such a sale by a sole 
practitioner is improper.' This position is based upon the view 
that the sale would necessarily involve the violation of some or 
all of the following proscriptions: 
[1] To turn over the selling lawyer's files to the purchasing 
lawyer would, in virtually all cases, constitute a viola-
tion of the selling lawyer's duty of confidentiality.10 
[2] To the extent that the purchase price is a function of 
fees earned by the purchasing lawyer, the agreement 
violates the proscription of sharing fees without shar-
ing the effort and/or responsibility.ll 
[3] To the extent that some or all of the purchase price is 
paid, not to the selling lawyer, but to his estate, the 
agreement violates the proscription against sharing of 
fees with laypersons.11 
[4] The fact that the value of the lawyer's practice will de-
pend largely on the number of clients who follow his 
recommendation and retain the purchasing lawyer 
puts the selling lawyer in a position of direct conflict 
with his clients. 11 
[5] The sale would almost inevitably involve the recom-
mendation of employment of the purchaser in viola-
tion of the prohibition against the payment of money 
by a lawyer for the recommendation of him by an-
other.u Such recommendation might also be consid-
ered improper solicitation.111 
[6] Because most sales will include a covenant not to com-
pete with the purchasing lawyer, the agreement ar-
guably violates the prohibition against such covenants 
ations. They contain no specific reference to the sale of a law practice. 
9. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 266 (1945); New 
York County Lawyers Association Op. 109; Getl'en v. MoBS, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 687 (1975). See also Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553, 36 P. 107 (1894); Lyon v. 
Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966) (distribution of value of good will 
on diBSolution of partnership); Heywood v. Sooy, 45 Cal. App. 2d 423, 114 P.2d 361 
(1941); Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. Coopes, 93 Mich. App. 459, 287 N.W.2d 266 (1979); 
Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 1243 (1981). 
10. ABA Code DR 4-101 (1981). 
11. ld. DR 2-107. 
12. ld. DR 3-102. 
13. See ld. Canon 5. 
14. ld. DR 2-103(B) ("A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a 
person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client .... "). 
15. See id. DR 2-103(A); EC 2-3. 
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except as a condition to payment of retirement bene-
fits by a lawyer's former firm. l • 
To the extent that some or all of these objections have 
merit, their force cannot be mitigated by the rather transparent 
device of forming a "partnership" for a brief period of time prior 
to the retirement (or, if the attorney is somewhat prescient, the 
death) of the selling lawyer." 
Let us then consider the substance of each of the arguments 
which has been advanced in support of the prohibition against 
the sale of a law practice. 
A. CONFIDENTIALITY 
One major objection to the sale of a law practice is that it 
would violate the lawyer's obligation to refrain from disclosing 
confidences or secrets of the client. Ethical Consideration (EC) 
4-6 of the ABA Code· of Professional Responsibility provides: 
The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confi-
. dences and secrets of his client continues after 
the termination of the employment. Thus a law-
yer should not attempt to sell a law practice as a 
going business because, among other reasons, to 
do so would involve the disclosure of confidences 
and secrets . . . ." 
"Confidences" and "secrets" are defined in DR 4-101 in the 
following way: 
"Confidence" refers to information protected by 
the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, 
and "secret" refers to other information gained in 
the professional relationship that the client has 
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or would be likely 
to be detrimental to the client. 
16. rd. DR 2·108(A) ("A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partner· 
ship or employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to 
practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a 
condition to payment of retirement benefits."). 
Payments made by a purchasing attorney are functionally equivalent to retirement 
benefits and should be 80 treated for purposes of this rule. Nonethelesa, one commenta· 
tor has justified the general prohibition in part on the basis of this rule. See Sterrett, 
supra note 3, at 316·18. 
17. See Sterrett, supra note 3, at 324·25. 
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If the model contemplated by EC 4-6 is the sale through 
advertisement to the highest bidder, then the concern expressed 
is well founded. Many, if not most, attorneys' files will contain 
"secrets" if not "confidences" of the client. Most purchasers 
would doubtless want to know a good deal more about the cli-
ents and the matters being handled than a file would reveal. But 
the attempted sale of a practice in such a manner is so profes-
sionally irresponsible as to be indefensible, wholly apart from 
the potential violations of Canon 4.18 
Suppose, though, the situation posed in the introduction. 
Lawyer wishes to retire and, in the course of his practice, has 
had occasion to work with and against most of the other lawyers 
in the area. One in particular has impressed him as competent, 
honest, and sensitive to the needs of his clients. After discussing 
the possibility of having the second lawyer take over the busi-
ness of as many of his clients as agree to retain him, retiring 
lawyer writes to his clients informing them of his impending re-
tirement, his desire that their affairs be handled by a competent 
successor, his belief that he has found such a person, the reasons 
for that belief and the eventual need to disclose privileged mate-
rial to such person. The letter would also make unmistakably 
clear the client's right to refuse to allow disclosure, to select an-
other lawyer and, at any time, to discharge the recommended 
lawyer if the client is dissatisfied.18 Presumably, if the letter 
were clear, an affirmative response by the client would satisfy 
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C), which provides that ee[a] lawyer may 
reveal . . . confidences or secrets with the consent of the client 
or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them." 
When a client retains a lawyer who is not a 'sole practi-
tioner, the relationship is perceived as one between the client 
and the firm of which the lawyer is a member. Hence, for pur-
poses of the proscription against disclosure of confidences and 
secrets, the attorney is, collectively, the law firm. so It follows 
18. The existence and practices of brokers who specialize in such sales was a matter 
of justifiable concern to one commentator. Sterrett, supra note 3, at 316. 
19. Sterrett suggests that those lawyers who sell their practices believe that full dis-
closure would reduce the likelihood of their clients retaining the purchasing attorney, 
Sterrett, supra note 3, at 311, but he presents no persuaaive data to support such 
conjecture. 
20. See ABA Code EC 4-2 (1981) (unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may 
disclose the affairs of his client to partners or associates of his firm."). 
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that if the lawyer primarily responsible for a client retires or 
dies, his replacement by another lawyer in the firm involves no 
violation of Canon 4~ll This may seem self-evident to lawYers, 
but it is worth considering whether it is always as self-evident to 
clients, or whether it corresponds to a client's reasonable 
expectations. 
If a major corporate client retains a large firm, it is clear to 
everyone that it is the firm that is being retained. Often, of 
course, one or two members of the firm have primary responsi-
bility for the coordination of the firm's representation, and one 
member may be the "contact" lawyer for the client, but it is well 
understood that the client's work will be handled by a number 
of lawyers, all of whom will have access to the client's file.11 
In a small firm the legal relationship is the same, but the 
understanding of the client-or at least his reasonable expecta-
tions-may be entirely different. Suppose, for example, that af-
ter a number of years as a successful domestic relations sole 
practitioner, a lawyer retains a young associate to handle his in-
creasing work load. It may be true that at least some clients who 
employ the firm after the new lawyer is associated do not expect 
that the older lawyer will handle all, or even any, of their mat-
ters. But those clients who have been represented by the older 
lawyer for some time are in an entirely different position. Not 
only did they not retain the new lawyer, they (unlike the major 
corporate clients) never retained a "firm" at all. In effect, their 
confidences and secrets are now theoretically freely available to 
a lawyer they never selected, and only because he is a member of 
a "firm" which had never before existed.IIB 
I am not suggesting that there is anything improper in what 
I have just described. I am, however, suggesting that in terms of 
the clients' reasonable expectations of nondisclosure of confi-
dences, the situation is not appreciably different from one in 
21. ABA Code Canon 4 (1981). But cf. proposed CALIFORNIA RULE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 2-112, discuaseci at note 65, infra. 
22. ABA Code EC 4-2 (1981). 
23. It seems to me highly unlikely that many clients would be aware of their right 
under EC 4-2 to prohibit disclosure, and even more unlikely that lawyers would direct 
their attention to it. Moreover, as a practical matter, it might be extremely difficult to 
prevent the disclosure of any but oral communications. 
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which the lawyer simply sold his practice to a successor and 
agreed to consult when needed. In other words, in the context of 
confidentiality, should it make a difference that an associate is 
"employed" by a sole practitioner rather than being "sold" a 
practice? 
From the standpoint of the lawyer, of course, it would be 
burdensome to solicit the approval of each present client before 
allowing a new associate access to a client's file. Presumably, this 
burden can legitimately be placed on the lawyer who sells his 
practice because, in the situation where anew lawyer is hired, 
the original lawyer is, at a minimum, equally responsible for any 
financial damage done the client, and his continuing association 
provides some assurance of his belief in the competence and 
trustworthiness of his associate. But a belief in another lawyer's 
abilities and discretion plainly does not in itself allow the re-
vealing of confidences. In short, despite the fact that many cli-
ents who retain firms implicitly or explicitly accept the fact that 
their confidences will be shared by a number of attorneys, many 
others have no such understanding, and may be unaware of their 
theoretical right to prevent any disclosure. If that is true (or to 
the extent that it is true) the importance of confidentiality as a 
factor in determining the propriety of the sale of a law practice 
is diminished.14 
Once again, this does not mean that confidentiali~y is unim-
portant, or that lawyers should be required to obtain advance 
approval before allowing a new associate access to a client's files. 
However, the employment of an associate may be similar to the 
association of another lawyer for a particular matter and has 
much in common with the case of a retiring sole practitioner 
who sells his practice. And, as has been made clear, before turn-
ing over any matters to a successor, the lawyer should be re-
quired to disclose fully all aspects of the transaction and to ex~ 
plain clearly the client's right to obtain his file and to decline 
employing the successor. In short, with appropriate advance no-
tice to a client, the issue of confidentiality disappears. Either the 
client consents to the new representation or he receives all of his 
24. If the selling lawyer is responsible, at least to some extent, for the malpractice of 
the purchasing lawyer, many of the real concerns can be eliminated. See text accompa-
nying notes 33-39, infra. 
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papers without their having been seen by a third party. 
Such a procedure should not pose severe practical problems. 
The selling attorney could easily describe to the successor, in 
general terms, the nature of his existing practice, its income po-
tential, and the proposed terms of the sale without disclosing 
specific information about individual clients. It should not take 
clients more than a couple of weeks to respond to the selling 
lawyer's letter. In addition, of course, the selling lawyer would 
be available to discuss the change with his clients and to advise 
them accordingly. III The conclusion seems obvious that if the 
prohibition against the sale of a practice rested solely on the 
confidentiality rationale, it would be plainly unjustified.11 
B. IMPROPER SHARING or Fos WITH ANOTHER LAWYER 
A second objection to an agreement for the sale of a law 
practice is that it would violate Disciplinary Rule 2-107, which 
provides: 
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal ser-
vices with another lawyer who is not a partner in 
or associate of his law firm or law office, unless 
(1) The client consents to employment 
of the other lawyer after a full disclo-
sure that a division of fees will be 
made. 
(2) The division is made in proportion 
to the services performed and responsi-
bility assumed by each. 
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does 
not clearly exceed reasonable compen-
25. It is also possible that the retiring lawyer may consult with the client or the 
succ:esaor lawyer, whenever this is desirable. 
26. ABA Code EC 4-6 (1981) states: 
A lawyer should also provide for the protection of the confi-
dences and secrets of his client following the termination of 
the practice of the lawyer, whether termination is due to 
death, disability or retirement . . .. In determining the 
method of disposition [of the papers of both lawyer and client] 
the instructions and wishes of the client should be a dominant 
consideration. 
Not only is the procedure I have suggested consistent with the thrust of the rule, it 
is certainly arguable that 8 lawyer who makes no effort to determine how a client would 
want his files disposed of is acting in a professionally irresponsible manner. See text 
accompanying note 65, infra. 
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sation for all legal services they ren-
dered the client. 
There is no inherent reason why an agreement for the sale 
of a law practice would necessarily violate either subsection 
(A)(1) or (A)(3) of the rule. Subsection (A)(l) can easily be com-
plied with, and (A)(3) appears to allow some increase in fees. 
Even under a rule like California Rule of Professional Conduct 
2-108, which prohibits any fee increase solely because of the di-
vision of fees,l'7 it is likely that the purchasing lawyer would still 
be in a better economic position than he would without the ben-
efit of a significant in-place clientele. 
Subsection (A)(2), though, presents a problem. The selling 
lawyer is not likely to perform future services for his former cli-
ents.IB Whether he will share responsibility depends upon what 
the agreement provides and what the concept of shared respon-
sibility means. In ABA Formal Opinion 204,111 the Committee on 
Professional Ethics made it clear that a division of service or 
responsibility could serve as the basis for a division of fees. The 
Committee, though, was less than clear about the proper appli-
cation of that rule, stating that "[s)ervices ... may apply to the 
selection and retainer of associate counsel."IO The extent of cli-
ent participation in the process of advice given the client, and of 
supervision and/or control by the referring lawyer were consid-
ered factors in determining whether "services" had been per-
formed, and whether a division of fees was proper. 
27. A member of the State Bar shall not divide a fee for legalser-
vices with another person licensed to practice law who is not a 
partner or associate in the member's law firm or law office, 
unless (1) The client consents in writing to employment of the 
other person licensed to practice law after a full disclosure 
has been made in writing that a division of fees will be made 
and the terms of such division; and (2) the total fee charged 
by all persons licensed to practice law is not increaaed solely 
by reason of the provision for division of fees and does not 
exceed reasonable compensation for all Bervices they render to 
the client. 
CALIF. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-108(A) (1981). 
This provision legitimates the so-called "referral fee" if its specific requirements are 
complied with. See text accompanying note 65, infra. 
28. But see note 25, supra. 
29. ABA Comm. on ProfeBBionai Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 204 (1940). 
30. [d. 
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Under the ABA Code, the specific division of fees must cor-
respond to a division of services or responsibility, a measure-
ment that the ABA Committee found virtually impossible to 
make. As the Committee stated in Opinion 204: 
"Inasmuch as the amount of a lawyer's fee 
presents no ethical questions unless it is 
flagrantly excessive, ... it is not the province of 
this committee to measure the services rendered 
or responsibility assumed or incurred by the reo 
spective lawyers who become so associated or to 
apportion a fee charged therefore." 
What strikes one about this opinion is its apparent willing-
ness to approve (or at least not disapprove) any fee sharing ar-
rangement short of a "no strings attached" referral fee, without 
regard to the cost to the client save for the "flagrantly excessive" 
fee. And, in fact there is a suggestion in ABA Opinion 26581 that 
a mildly disguised forwarding fee would not be disapproved if 
there was an advance agreement between the two lawyers. In 
short, the reality appears to be that the ABA "rule" is virtually 
a dead letter, gutted in substance by the inability to apply it in 
any specific case. Moreover, as written and interpreted, it pro-
vides at best minimal protection against excessive fees being 
charged the clients. 
Perhaps because of both of those reasons, California in 1979 
amended Rule 2-108 of the Rules of Professional Conduct811 (the 
analogue of DR 2-107) and eliminated the prohibition against 
referral fees provided that two requirements are met. First, the 
client must consent in writing after full disclosure by the attor-
ney of the fact and terms of a proposed division of fees; second, 
the total fee charged by both (or all) attorneys must not be in-
creased solely by reason of the division and, in any event, may 
not exceed reasonable compensation for all services rendered. 
California, then, by legitimating referral fees, has ironically pro-
vided more protection to the client than the more "restrictive" 
Code of Professional Responsibility. 
If a client gives informed consent to a fee sharing arrange-
ment, and is assured that he will not pay more solely because of 
31. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 265 (1945). 
32. For the text of Rule 2·108 see note 27, supra. 
11
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such an arrangement, is there nonetheless a valid reason for 
prohibiting fee-splitting except in cases where services and/or 
responsibility are shared? Certainly one argument in favor of the 
present rule is that it may prevent the sale of a client to the 
highest bidder. If the selling lawyer will neither work with the 
purchasing lawyer, nor assume responsibility for his actions, a 
"worst case" scenario would have the selling lawyer getting the 
best price he could, regardless of his personal opinion of the 
competence or sense of responsibility of the purchasing lawyer. 
Even if the purchasing lawyer were competent, he might be 
tempted to recoup his payments by treating the clients' matters 
less thoroughly than he should. In other words, if an increase in 
fees is prohibited, a decrease in quantity and quality of work 
must be considered a real possibility. 
There is no doubt that such a possibility exists, but it is not 
serious enough to justify a complete prohibition on the sale of a 
practice. In the first place, it should strike one as odd that a rule 
that discourages the accomplishment of a socially useful 
end-the orderly transition of clients' affairs-is justified by the 
profession on the ground that it will protect a few clients from a 
few unethical practitioners. Second, such an overinclusive rule is 
even more peculiar when it is demonstrably ineffective. By the 
simple device of associating the purchasing lawyer for a decent 
interval, the seller can avoid complying with any of the relevant 
disciplinary rules. Third, it is not clear that a client, even under 
the "worst case" scenario is remediless. Presumably, the selling 
lawyer owed a duty to his former clients to exercise reasonable 
care in recommending a new lawyer. If that duty was breached, 
and the client suffered damage by the negligence of the purchas-
ing lawyer, the client should have an action against both the 
purchasing and selling lawyer." Moreover, if this duty were 
clearly expressed in a Rule of Professional Conduct," it would 
provide disciplinary sanctions against the selling attorney and, 
perhaps more significantly, might be viewed by a court as estab-
lishing a standard for liability in a civil action. II 
33. The case is analogous to the corporate "looting" cases in which directors have 
been held liable when they sold a corporation without adequate investigation of the pur-
chaser who proceeded to loot the corporation. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 
622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
34. E.g., EC 4-6, set forth at note 26, supra. 
35. See Minkus, Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation: The Client As Consumer, 11 
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That the real concern may be the necessity for joint respon-
sibility was expressed, at least implicitly, in ABA Formal Opin-
ion 31688 which dealt with the practice of law across state lines. 
In that Opinion, the Committee declared that fee-splitting 
among lawyers who are associated, but are not licensed to prac-
tice in specific jurisdictions, would be acceptable as long as the 
lawyer who was not licensed to practice nevertheless shared re-
sponsibility for any malpractice liability incurred by the lawyer 
actually performing the services.8 '7 
If this focus on protection of the client is really the major 
concern, then it can be dealt with by requiring the selling lawyer 
to maintain, for a reasonable period of time, insurance that 
would cover liability that arose because of the malpractice of the 
purchasing lawyer.88 Moreover, such a requirement can be ap-
plied equally to agreements between sole practitioners and 
agreements among members of a firm. That is, whether the pay-
ments to a retiring lawyer are payments from the sale of a prac-
tice, or retirement benefits from a partnership, the agreement 
would include provisions for insuring the selling or retiring sole 
practitioner or partner. Be 
In summary, while present Disciplinary Rule 2-107 does ap-
pear to prevent the sale of a practice, it is not clear that it actu-
ally does so-at least as it has been interpreted. In any event, it 
C.T.L.A. FORUM 236 (1981). 
36. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Opinion 316 (1967). 
37. This suggests that the focus of the inquiry ought to be placed more on the 
means of assuring that the selection of a successor will be at least as carefully considered 
as the selection of a partner or associate. Profe8BOr Morgan makes essentially the same 
point in his perceptive criticism of Rule 2·103. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Profes· 
sionol Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702, 719·21 (1977). 
38. The so·called "tail" insurance, which covers the selling attorney for future 
claims based on malpractice while he was in practice would not· cover this derivative 
liability though it is probably important to require that such a policy be maintained. 
Typically the cost to the selling lawyer of tail insurance is approximately 225% of the 
annual premium to provide a policy that will cover indefinitely all claims based upon the 
selling lawyer's conduct up to the date of retirement. Rule 1.5 of the Proposed Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct would allow fee sharing if all attorneys remain liable for 
any malpractice. 
39. To my knowledge, there is no policy specifically tailored to cover only derivative 
liability. Hence, at the present time the selling lawyer would have to obtain standard 
malpractice insurance. However, it certainly seems possible that if a demand for this 
type of insurance existed, insurers could establish a significantly less costly policy. At a 
minimum, such a possibility ought to be explored. 
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is a demonstrably ineffective rule with form ruling over sub-
stance. While purporting to be client-protecting, it provides 
minimal protection to a client's interests and impedes a socially 
desirable goal, all because a few unethical lawyers might abuse 
the privilege of selling the good will they have built up over the 
years-the value of which their colleagues in partnerships may 
realize. A lawyer, in all likelihood, will choose a "real" partner or 
associate with care, and the selection of a purchaser for a prac-
tice or a "quickie" partner or associate may not be as carefully 
selected. But, in the case of a truly responsible practitioner, due 
care will be given to the selection of a successor, and in the case 
of the irresponsible or unethical practitioner, the rule is of dubi-
ous effectiveness anyway. The California approach of full writ-
ten disclosure and approval together with protection against fee 
increases, is a much more straightforward approach and will, as 
well as any rule can, eliminate (or at least minimize) some of the 
evils conjured up by defenders of the status quo. Furthermore, if 
approval of a sale were conditioned on the continuing liability of 
the selling lawyer (at least for some specified period), there is no 
legitimate DR 2-107 objection to the sale. 
C. DIVISION OF FEES WITH LAY PERSONS 
A third objection is that in the case of a deceased lawyer, or 
in the case of an agreement that is to continue after the death of 
the selling lawyer, the agreement would violate the proscription 
against sharing fees with lay persons.40 
Disciplinary Rule ~-102 prohibits sharing of fees with a non-
lawyer except in three specific instances: Employees may be in-
cluded in a compensation or retirement plan even though it is 
based on profit sharing; a lawyer, completing the work of a de-
ceased lawyer, may pay to the decedant's estate the portion of 
the fee attributable to the decedant's work; and, most relevant 
for our purposes, "an agreement by a lawyer with his firm, part-
ner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a 
reasonable period of time after his death, to his estate or to one 
or more specified persons."n 
It should first be noted that this proscription is included not 
40. ABA Code DR 3·102 (1981). 
41. [d. DR 3·102(A)(1). 
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in Canon 2, which deals with fees, but in Canon 3, which states: 
"A Lawyer Should Assist In Preventing the Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law." The "justification" for the placement of the rule 
(and, perhaps, for the rule itselO is found in Ethical Considera-
tion 3-8: 
Since a lawyer should not aid or encourage a lay-
man to practice law, he should not practice law in 
association with a layman or otherwise share fees 
with a layman. This does not mean, however, that 
the pecuniary value of the interest of a deceased 
lawyer in his firm or practice may not be paid to 
his estate or specified persons such as his widow 
or heirs. In like manner, profit-sharing retirement 
plans of a lawyer or law firm which include non-
lawyer office employees are not improper. These 
limited exceptions to the rule against sharing le-
gal fees with laymen are permissible since they 
do not aid or encourage laymen to practice law. 
(emphasis added) 
Although I do not believe that the justification for the gen-
eral fee sharing prohibition can withstand serious analysis, it is 
not my purpose to advocate the repeal of DR 3-102. But to the 
extent that the specific exceptions are justified because they do 
not aid or encourage the practice of law, that is equally true of 
the payment to the estate, or heirs or a deceased sole practi-
tioner. The spouse of a deceased lawyer is no more encouraged 
to practice law if payments are made by a successor lawyer than 
if they are made by the deceased lawyer's former firm, partner 
or associate, and DR 3-102 should clearly recognize that fact. In 
other words, I concede that DR 3-102, read literally, prohibits 
payments to the estate or heirs by a successor lawyer. But the 
distinction between a firm, partner or associate on the one hand, 
and a successor lawyer on the other, bears no rational relation-
ship to the perceived evil-the assisting in the unauthorized 
practice of law-and such distinction should be abolished in Ca-
non 3. 
There are, to be sure, significant differences between the 
sale of a practice by means of a pre-retirement agreement with 
appropriate safeguards negotiated by a selling attorney, and a 
post-death sale of a practice by a representative of the estate. 
15
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Those differences will be considered later,411 but whatever differ-
ent treatment may be justified or required, DR 3-102 and EC 3-
8 plainly provide no basis for any rational distinction between 
payments by a former firm and payments by a successor lawyer. 
D. CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Although it is arguable that none of the provisions of Canon 
5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Judgment on Behalf 
of A Client") apply directly to a lawyer who is selling his prac-
tice, it seems reasonably clear that such a lawyer has a potential 
conflict of interest. On the one hand, he is concerned with pro-
viding his former clients the most adequate representation pos-
sible, and will be looking for the lawyer best suited in terms of 
competence, integrity, and style to take over the particular prac-
tice. This desire is strengthened by the lawyer's concern for his 
own reputation (and perhaps his potentialliability).48 It is quite 
unlikely that a lawyer who has spent his entire working life es-
tablishing a reputation for competence and honesty would risk 
the loss of that reputation for the sake of a marginally better 
financial arrangement. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt a danger that the sell-
ing lawyer's willingness to recommend the purchaser to his cli-
ents may be affected by his self-interest in selling the practice, 
or in selling the practice to a specific individual. The nature of 
the conflict may depend upon the specific financial arrange-
ments. For example, a contract which provides for gradually de-
creasing payments over a long period of time based on fees re-
ceived from the seller's present clients, would create a relatively 
minor conflict. It is plainly in the self-interest of the lawyer to 
recommend a successor who will enjoy the confidence of the for-
mer clients, since each client who defects costs the seller money. 
In contrast, an outright sale for a fixed price presents an obvious 
case of conflict. The seller has no economic inducement to assure 
that the purchaser is appropriate. A sale on those terms more 
easily lends itself to the danger that the highest bidder., rather 
than the most appropriate attorney, will take over the practice. 
This danger is most acute when the seller is not the attorney 
(who has a reputation to protect) but rather the estate, which 
42. See sections Sale by a Lawyer and Sale by the Estate, infra. 
43. See text accompanying notes 33·39, supra. 
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may have fewer (or no) informal constraints on its behavior. Be-
cause the sale by the lawyer and the sale by his estate raise dif-
ferent problems and may require different rules, I shall discuss 
them separately. 
(1) Sale by a Lawyer 
A sale negotiated by a lawyer who is still practicing does not 
raise any unique problems of conflict of interest. The thrust of 
Canon 5 is not that there can be no conflict of interest between 
attorney and client, but rather that any conflict must be fully 
disclosed to the client, who then may choose to continue the re-
lationship." That principle obviously applies to the sale of a 
practice. The selling lawyer has an obligation to his present cli-
ents which would require him to fully disclose all aspects of the 
proposed arrangement with the successor lawyer when recom-
mending that the clients retain the successor. But, beyond that, 
the situation does not seem markedly different from any other 
in which there is a conflict and which, under the ABA Code, can 
be cured by full disclosure and informed consent.4I1f.the disclo-
sure and client consent allow a lawyer to enter into a business 
transaction with his own client when their interests are in direct 
conflict, surely such disclosure and consent will cure any taint on 
a selling lawyer's recommendation of his successor. In short, un-
less we are to reconsider all of Canon 5, whatever conflict of in-
terest problems are raised by the sale of a practice are easily 
solvable, at least in the case of the sale by the lawyer. If the 
lawyer has died without having provided for the disposition of 
his practice, the problems are more serious. 
(2) Sale by the Estate 
Sale of a practice by an estate would be accomplished by 
the personal representative, with court approval, and presuma-
bly with the informed approval of the heirs of the decedent. 
I have already discussed the problem of sharing fees with a 
44. See e.g., ABA Code DR 5-104(A) (1981) ("A lawyer shall not enter into a busi-
ness transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client 
expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the 
client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure. "). 
. 45. Id. DR 5-104(A), ECs 5-2, 5-3. Whether the Code's solution to problems involv-
ing conflicts is appropriate is a subject for another day. See generally Morgan, supra 
note 37, at 727-32. 
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layperson.46 For the reasons stated, the prohibition makes no 
sense in this situation, and the ABA Code should be amended to 
eliminate any distinction between partnerships and solo prac-
tices in the context of payments to an estate.47 
However, if the sale is made by the estate, there is a more 
substantial confidentiality issue. Unlike the lawyer who negoti-
ates the sale of his own practice, the personal representative and 
his attorney are strangers to the clients and, at least theoreti-
cally, whatever confidential material is included in the dece-
dent's file and papers should not be revealed to either the per-
sonal representative or the attorney for the estate.48 But as a 
practical matter, it would be virtually impossible to comply with 
such a stringent rule. In the first place, the client must be noti-
fied of his attorney's death, presumably requiring at least a cur-
sory look at the file to determine the client's whereabouts. Sec-
ond, it is irresponsible for the estate's attorney not to at least 
review the file to determine if the client is in need of immediate 
action to avoid a foreclosure, the running of a statute of limita-
tions, or the like. Third, the estate is, at a minimum, entitled to 
the fees earned by the decedent up to the time of his death, and 
it is unlikely that the estate can determine the amount owed to 
it without some review of the file. Under the circumstances, and 
particularly with advance court approval, the attorney for the 
estate should not be precluded from reviewing the filen nor 
should the problem of confidentiality, in itself, preclude the sale 
of the practice of a deceased attorney. 
In fact, although there may be other problems for the law-
yer who examines the decedent's files (he may, for example, find 
himself disqualified from representing someone opposing the in-
dividual whose file he reviewed), the confidentiality issue seems 
46. See text accompanying notes 40-42, supra. 
47. It should be noted that payments to the estate of a deceased partner may be 
based on earnings of the firm subsequent to the death of the partner. ABA Comm. on 
Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 327 (1971) (overruling prior opinions). To the extent 
that a major concern is that the purchasing lawyer will try to recoup payments by raising 
fees or reducing services, the same concern is present in partnership agreements by 
which an estate is paid portions of fees which the decedent had no hand in obtaining or 
earning. See Sterrett, supra note 3, at 313-15. 
48. ABA Code DR 4-101(B) (1981). 
49. It is arguable that the estate representative would be entitled to review the files 
under DR 4-101(C)(4), which allows a lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets necessary to 
collect a fee, or under DR 4-101(C)(2), if a prior court order is obtained. 
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much overemphasized. To adhere rigidly to it could mean that 
the decedent's secretary, who is not a lawyer but is properly 
aware of confidential information, could review files and inform 
clients of their options, but a trained lawyer who has no eco-
nomic interest in the client's matter could not. Such a rule 
makes little sense, and for purposes of Canon 4, it would be bet-
ter to treat the personal representative and his attorney as func-
tionally equivalent to the other non-partners and non-associates 
who have access to a lawyer's files. 110 Certainly, if advance court 
approval is obtained, it is difficult to see why this situation 
presents more or greater danger to the letter and spirit of Canon 
4 than does the revealing of information to secretaries, investiga-
tors, paraprofessionals and the like. In summary, although the 
problems are different from those of the retiring lawyer, it is not 
clear that the perceived violation of DR 4-101 justifies the pre-
clusion of the sale of a practice by an estate. 
The conflict of interest problem, however, is substantially 
more serious than in the case of a retiring lawyer. First, and per-
haps most importantly, the effect of the informal constraints 
that I posited earlier are substantially lessened. Unlike the retir-
ing lawyer, his personal representative has no obvious interest in 
the reputational aspect of assuring a sale to an appropriate suc-
cessor. That does not mean, of course, that a personal represen-
tative might not be concerned about the effect of the sale on the 
reputation of the decedent, but common sense suggests that the 
strength of that concern is likely to be substantially less than if 
the decedent were the seller. 
Second, there is no possibility of anyon-going relationship, 
however informal, between the former lawyer and his clients or 
between the former lawyer and his successor. 
50. See ABA Code DR 4-10I(D)i EC 4-2 (1981). The ABA has opined that 
.. lilt is entirely proper for the professional colleagues of a de-
ceased lawyer, out of regard for him, and with the approval of 
the widow or personal representative, to take such steps as are 
necessary to protect the immediate interests of his clients and 
to advise such clients that they are doing so, making it clear to 
the clients that the papers of the latter will be turned over 
promptly to any other attorney whom the client may desire to 
designate." 
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 266 (1945). 
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Third, unlike the decedent, the estate representative stands 
in a fiduciary relationship to the estate and its beneficiaries. As 
a result, there is at least some exposure to liability if the sale of 
the practice did not bring the "best" price. il That is, the infor-
mal constraints that would prevent improper sales for a rela-
tively small additional amount, are not only lessened, but may 
be in conflict with a fiduciary duty to obtain the best price possi-
ble from a successor attorney. 
Fourth, the estate, unlike the retiring lawyer, is much less 
likely to enter into any long term arrangement. The desirability 
of closing the estate quickly, and the lack of any obvious interest 
in the welfare of the decedent's clients, substantially increase 
the likelihood of a cash sale of the practice-precisely the situa-
tion in which the danger to the clients is the greatest. 
It is not completely clear that these added risks should in 
all cases preclude the sale of a practice by an estate.i • Perhaps 
court approval of the sale after full disclosure of the investiga-
tions made and negotiations conducted with the purchaser, as 
well as the efforts to find other purchasers, would suffice. Cer-
tainly, a requirement that the estate maintain insurance would 
significantly minimize the risk to the clients, but such a require-
ment might be impractical. In any event, the risks and consider-
ations involved are different and approval of a "retirement" sale 
does not preclude disapproval of an "estate" sale. 
Assuming that estate sales were allowed, if the sale were ne-
gotiated by the attorney for the estate, he should be precluded 
from representing any of the decedent's former clients. While 
this proscription may appear overbroad, it is desirable for sev-
eral reasons. First, the possibility of placing undue pressure on 
the client to retain the estate's attorney is strong, particularly if 
there is a need for immediate action. Second, if the estate attor-
ney were allowed to solicit there would be a strong temptation 
for him to solicit only the "good" cases or clients, leaving the 
other clients to fend for themselves with little time and effort 
being given to assist them. Third, allowing the estate attorney to 
51. See generally 2 Scon, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 169·185 (3d ed. 1967). 
52. Again, I am talking only about the sale of goodwill. Obviously, the estate could 
sell tangible assets, and would be entitled to fees earned by the decedent prior to his 
death. 
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purchase some or all of the practice places him in a clear conflict 
of interest with his client-the estate-since any fee allocation 
which benefits his client operates to his detriment. Conse-
quently, on balance, it would be best to preclude the acceptance 
of any client by the attorney for the estate. To deal with situa-
tions in which such a rule would create a real hardship to a par-
ticular client, court approval for the representation could be 
sought. 
Even if estate sales were treated differently, there is one sit-
uation when the sale by an estate should be allowed with court 
approval. If the decedent entered into an arrangement with an-
other lawyer for the sale of the practice upon death, and the 
clients were notified in the same way they would have been were 
the lawyer retiring, the estate should be allowed to complete the 
transaction. Here, although many of the problems raised do ex-
ist, the likelihood of a sale to an improper successor has been 
greatly diminished. The negotiations were conducted by the de-
cedent, and notice to all clients was sent while the decedent was 
alive. Consequently, the informal constraints on the seller were 
present, the agreement was not made "under the gun," and the 
clients have had some time to consider whether they wish to re-
tain the successor or another lawyer. Finally, court approval of 
the transaction would add another level of protection to the in-
terests of the decedent's clients. 
In summary, the sale of a law practice by an estate should 
be considered separately from the question of the sale by a retir-
ing lawyer. Under some circumstances both might be appropri-
ate, but the considerations discussed justify different safeguards, 
and may, in some circumstances, arguably justify total prohibi-
tion of the sale by an estate.1I8 
E. ANTI-SOLICITATION RULES 
Disciplinary Rule 2-103 provides, in relevant part, that 
(B) A lawyer shall not compensate or give any-
53. Although this may be thought of as "unfair" to the heirs, it is important to 
remember that my premise is that the law ought to encourage professionally responsible 
behavior by lawyers, specifically, the planning for an orderly transition of clients' affairs. 
By hypothesis, in the estate sale that has not been done. Under those circumstances, one 
can reasonably conclude that, on balance, the dangers to the clients inherent in the sale 
outweigh the benefits to the lawyer's heirs. 
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thing of value to a person or organization to rec-
ommend or secure his employment by a client, or 
as a reward for having made a recommendation 
resulting in his employment .... 
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organi-
zation to recommend or promote the use of his 
services ... except as authorized in DR 2-101 
[regulating the content of advertising]. 
In light of decisions of the United States Supreme Courta. 
invalidating a variety of restrictions on methods by which attor-
neys obtain business, predictions about the validity of any anti-
solicitation rule are somewhat speculative. Nonetheless. it does 
seem clear after Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association"" that 
activity which is likely to involve overreaching or undue influ-
ence may generally be prohibited and subjected to disciplinary 
sanctions regardless of whether harm has been demonstrated in 
a specific case. Yet, it is clear from the Code that the anti-solici-
tation prohibitions are not intended to apply to an attorney's 
communications with his clients. Disciplinary Rule 2-104 allows 
the lawyer to accept employment obtained through direct solici-
tation of a former or present client. lit That, together with the 
various opinions interpreting Disciplinary Rule 2-103(B)"T and 
(C),&8 and its predecessors, Canons 27"11 and 2880 of the Canons 
54. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 
447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 
(1977). 
55. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
56. See ABA Code DR 2-104(A) (1981) ("A lawyer who has given in-person unsolic-
ited advice to a layperson that he should obtain counselor take legal action shall not 
accept employment resulting from that advice, except that: (1) A lawyer may accept em-
ployment by ... one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client."). 
57. ABA Code DR 2-103(B) ("A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of 
value to a person or organization to recommend or secure hiB employment. . . ."). 
58. Id. DR 2-103(C) ("A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recom-
mend or promote the use of his services .... "). 
59. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS or PROPESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 ("It is 
unprofessional to solicit professional employment ... through touters or by personal 
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations .... ") 
60. Id. Canon 28 provided: 
"It is disreputable ... to breed litigation by seeking out those 
with claims ... in order to secure them as clienta, or to em-
ploy agents or runners for like purposes, or to payor reward, 
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bring-
ing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate [those] who 
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly 
advice, in influencing [potential clients] to seek his profes-
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of Professional Ethics, makes it reasonably clear that the major 
evils to be prohibited are the employment of cappers and run-
ners compensated on a per capita basis and/or the splitting of 
fees in violation of Disciplinary Rules 2-107 and 3-102.'1 That 
does not mean, of course, that payment by a successor is not 
literally covered by the rule. But if there are legitimate concerns 
about the latter situation they are certainly of a different nature 
and magnitude than those which resulted in the 'enactment of 
Canons 27 and 28, and Disciplinary Rule 2-103, 
For all the reasons already discussed, DR 2-103 should be 
amended to exclude cases in which the compensation and rec-
ommendation were given in the context of the sale of a law prac-
tice. Such an amendment would do no violence to the legitimate 
concerns underlying that Disciplinary Rule and would be a 
much more satisfactory solution than an opinion "interpreting" 
DR 2-103, inasmuch as the latter would not preclude a State Bar 
from rejecting the interpretation and subjecting both the selling 
and purchasing lawyers to disciplinary proceedings. 
In short, I concede the potential violations of Disciplinary 
Rule 2-103 as it presently exists. I believe, though, that it was 
not intended to deal with the issue at hand and that it should be 
amended to clearly state that fact. Even if I am wrong about the 
intent of the draftsmen of the Canons and the Code, I hope that 
what I have already said justifies the nonapplication of the rule 
to the seller and purchaser of a law practice. 
F. RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE 
Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) provides that "[a] lawyer shall 
not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment 
agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law af-
ter the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, 
except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits." 
Although the basis for the general prohibition is somewhat 
unclear," the policy underlying the exception is plainly applica-
sional services." 
61. See e.g., ABA Comm. on ProfeBBional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 147 
(1935); ABA Comm. on ProfeBBional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 78 (1932); ABA 
Comm. on ProfeBBional ~thics and Grievances, Formal Op. 73 (1932). 
62. See ABA Comm. on ProfeBBional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1971) (covenant im-
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ble to the situation in which the price paid to the seller is deter-
mined in part by the fees generated by his former practice.83 
Whether a retired lawyer is being compensated by his former 
firm, or by a successor attorney, a reasonable restrictive cove-
nant serves the same purpose-to prevent the retiree from capi-
talizing on the good will that he presumably bargained away in 
the compensation agreement.e• 
G. THE RELEVANCE OF CANONS 1 AND 6 
To this point, I have discussed the rules which collectively 
have been interpreted to prohibit the sale of a law practice, and 
have attempted to demonstrate that they either do not, or 
should not operate as a blanket prohibition. In doing so, I have 
tried to isolate the appropriate and legitimate concerns that 
should be specifically addressed by any proposed changes in the 
Code. But there is another consideration. If the legal profession 
takes seriously the admonition of Canon 1 that "A Lawyer 
Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of 
the Legal Profession", and of Canon 6 that "A Lawyer Should 
Represent a Client Competently"," then there is an affirmative 
obligation not only to authorize, but to encourage the orderly 
transition of a client's affairs. In the case of a sole practitioner 
that transition can best be accomplished by an honest and above 
board transaction between a lawyer and his proposed successor, 
with full disclosure to all clients and adequate protection of 
their rights and legitimate expectations .. 
Ethical Consideration 6-4 tells us that "[h]aving undertaken 
representation, a lawyer should use proper care to safeguard the 
interests of his client." Those interests do not cease to exist 
when the lawyer retires or dies. To force the client to fend for 
proper because it will lead to bartering in clients); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics 
Informal Op. 1072 (1968); Note, Attorneys Must Not Enter into Partnership Agree· 
ments Prohibiting Themselves from Representing Clients Upon Termination of the 
Partnership, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195 (1975) (empasizing the need to determine the 
actual effect of the agreement on a client's choice of counsel). 
63. It is arguable that the provision contemplates only employment agreements with 
restrictive covenants and, hence, is inapplicable to sales of law practices. For purposes of 
discussion I shall assume its applicability to all agreements between lawyers. 
64. Ethical Considerations aside, the restriction8 must be independently reasonable. 
See, e.g., CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601·16602 (West 1964), limiting the scope of 
such agreements to the geographic area in which the seller was carrying on his business 
and to the time that the purchaser or his assignee is carrying on a like business. 
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himself at such times is professional irresponsibility. Yet the 
present code, at least as interpreted, precludes the honest and 
competent lawyer from making an arrangement that would pro-
vide the client adequate information to make a decision about a 
successor, while at the same time allowing such a lawyer the eco-
nomic security that his colleagues in partnerships are given 
without restriction. sa 
III. CONCLUSION 
My perspective has been two-fold. From the standpoint of a 
sole practitioner, I am troubled by a rule which encourages a 
sham transaction if I or my heirs are to realize on the good will I 
have created over my professional life. From the standpoint of a 
65. Perhaps because of this, the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility 
and Conduct of the State Bar of California has proposed the adoption of a new Rule of 
Professional Conduct. Proposed Rule 2-112, at the present reads: Rule 2-112. Sale or 
Purchase of a Law Practice. 
(A) A law practice of a member or deceased member of the 
State Bar or a law firm, including consideration for good will, 
may be sold to or purchased by another member of the State 
Bar or law firm. The total fee charged to clients shall not be 
increased solely by reason of the payment of consideration for 
the good will or other intangible assets of the practice. 
(B) If the sale will involve the transfer of responsibility for the 
work on behalf of the seller's clients, then notice pursuant to 
the provisions of this rule must be given in all other sales and 
purchases. 
(C) The seller must notify clients in writing that an interest in 
the law practice is being sold to the purchaser and that the 
clients have the right to retain other counsel and to take pos-
session of their files. This notification must comply with the 
provisions of rule 2-101(A)(I}-(6), Rules of Professional Con-
duct, and the seller must disclose any conflict of interest. 
(D) The purchaser shall take reasonable steps to assure that 
the seller has complied with subdivision (C) of this rule. 
The Committee proposal makes no distinction between sales by an estate and sales by a 
retiring lawyer, and the Committee report did not consider the possibility of such dis-
tinction. THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDuer, RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PROPOSED NEW RULE 2-112, RULES or PRorES-
SIONAL CONDuer (ATTORNEYS' SALES OR PURCHASES or LAW PRACTICES) (August 29, 1981). 
In addition, the proposed rule would apparently apply in cases where a retiring partner 
or his estate received compensation from his former firm. The purpose of including such 
arrangements was to prevent avoidance of the disclosure provisions of the rule by the 
formation of "quickie" partnerships. Id. at 8. The Committee recognized the practical 
difficulties that such inclusion creates for large or medium sized firms in which partner-
ship interests change frequently. Id. Presumably, this will be one of the major issues 
considered by the State Bar Board of Governors in deciding whether to recommend ap-
proval of the rule to the California Supreme Court. (As of this writing, the Board of 
Governors has not reviewed or considered the Committee's Recommendations.) 
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client, I am disturbed at the possibility of receiving my file in 
the mail with a form note suggesting that I seek new counsel 
because my attorney has been discouraged from spending time 
planning for the disposition of his practice. 
Obviously, I am not asserting that there are no problems if 
sales of law practices were allowed. Indeed, my whole point is 
that if we identify the problems specifically enough, we can 
adopt rules tailored to those problems. Nor do I suggest that 
there might not be abuses of any relaxation of the present re-
strictions. As already pointed out,66 any change in the rules with 
respect to sales by an estate ought to be very carefully consid-
ered, and it may well be that on balance it is wiser to prohibit 
such sales in most or even all cases. 
Finally, I certainly do not want to underestimate the practi-
cal difficulties involved in the sale of a practice. How does one 
value the practice until the confidentiality waiver is given? How 
does one assure that the successor attorney does not simply skim 
the cream, but provides service to all of a retiring lawyer's cli-
ents? How full must disclosure to clients be to be considered 
adequate? How much can a lawyer legitimately try to influence 
his clients? What, if any, liability might the selling lawyer or 
estate incur, and what is his or its legal duty to former clients? 
Can insurance be obtained at a reasonable cost? On a different 
note, what tax or marital property consequences will flow from 
recognition of the legitimacy of such sales.S? I am sure other is-
sues will arise, and I do not pretend to have solutions to them. I 
do believe, though, that the time has come to review in a com-
prehensive and analytical fashion, the rules governing sales of 
law practices, and determine how best the profession can serve 
and accommodate the interests of both clients and lawyers in a 
professionally responsible manner. 
66. See text section on Sale by the Estate. 
67. See, e.g., Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); 
In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); Cantor, The Value 
of a Lawyer's Interest in His Practice, 43 N.Y.S.B.J. 47 (1971). 
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